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Capturing the cartel’s friends: Cartel facilitation
and the idea of joint criminal enterprise
Christopher Harding∗
Cartels; EC law; Joint enterprise; Penalties
The recent ruling by the Court of First Instance in AC-Treuhand (T-99/04), confirming
that a consultancy firm which had facilitated the operation of the Organic Peroxide
Cartel thereby infringed Art.81(1) EC, provides some insight into the nature of
punishable cartel offending. Now that involvement in business cartels attracts
significant sanctions at both a corporate and individual level the basis for such penal
liability requires a clear justification. The facilitation of cartels is part of that extra
layer of subterfuge which adds to the reprehensible character of the anticompetitive
damage arising from cartels, so as to justify penal measures such as large fines
and prison terms. A number of recent judgments serve to emphasise that the tough
regulation of cartels is as much about dealing with subterfuge and legal defiance as
the anticompetitive behaviour in itself. It is also instructive in this context to draw
upon the model of the joint criminal enterprise (JCE), as it has been developed in war
crimes proceedings, as a way of viewing an anticompetitive cartel as a joint illegal
enterprise, which necessarily and significantly includes the role of facilitating actors
as well as that of actual price fixers and the like.
Cartel delinquency
Embedded somewhere within the broad definition of prohibited anticompetitive conduct
under Art.81(1) EC is an area of “hard core” collusive activity commonly referred to
as that of a “cartel”. In practice, this is probably now the main form of anticompetitive
behaviour which is categorically condemned in official policy and seen as deserving
severe sanctions when detected. Interestingly, however, there is still no precise legal
definition of the term “cartel” at the EC level, nor an exact legal delineation of the
delinquency which underlies hardcore anticompetitive behaviour and which then provides
the legal basis for a penal response.1 There is, of course, a general and descriptive sense
of such conduct, in terms of a deliberate engagement in certain kinds of activity now well
understood to be indefensible as a matter of competition policy—typically price-fixing,
market sharing, bid-rigging and the fixing of quotas on production and supply.2
* Professor of Law, Department of Law and Criminology, Aberystwyth University.
1 See the earlier discussion of this point by Christopher Harding, “Forging the European Cartel Offence:
The Supranational Regulation of Business Conspiracy” (2004) 12 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law
and Criminal Justice 275.
2 See for instance the OECD definition in its Recommendation on Effective Action Against Hard Core
Cartels (1998): an anti-competitive agreement, concerted practice or arrangement to fix prices, make rigged
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In a general way, that is all clear enough, and a hard core cartel is recognisable as such,
known when seen, as it were. But in a normative sense, there remains some uncertainty
regarding the element of delinquency. What is so bad about this conduct that justifies
massive fines on companies, and sometimes now prison terms under national law for
company executives,3 and the vituperation4 of regulators? For the level of condemnation
and scale of penalty are now legally impressive. In 2007, for example, a single cartel was
fined by the European Commission a total of ¤992,312,200 and a single company within
that cartel a total of ¤479,669,850.5 Between 2000 and 2004, the Commission collected
a total of ¤3,697,516,100 in cartel fines; in the period 2005–2008 this total (to date) had
risen to ¤6,018,867,700.6 Vigorous penal activity is also evident at the national level,7
where, in addition, criminal convictions and prison terms for individual executives have
started to make an appearance, as discussed further below. At the same time, in a more
practical sense, while there is as yet an insufficiently defined “cartel offence” within
the terms of Art.81(1) EC, there is also uncertainty regarding the precise scope of the
punishable conduct, and who may be caught within the net of penal condemnation and
sanctions. As some of the discussion below will show, there has been some controversy
regarding the question of what legally counts as participation within a cartel, such as to
justify penal treatment.8
This lack of specificity regarding both the delinquent nature and penal scope of cartels is
evident when considering some recent legal developments relating to the facilitation of
cartel activity, and the extent to which such facilitation is covered by both the prohibition
of Art.81(1) EC and by national criminal offences applying to individuals who are
involved in the design and implementation of cartel activity. At the same time, some
focus on facilitating actions and the element of subterfuge involved in cartels may help in
understanding the strength of the condemnation of this kind of anticompetitive behaviour.
Cartel facilitation
In July 2008, the European Court of First Instance (CFI) confirmed9 that part of the
European Commission’s decision in 2003 on the Organic Peroxide Cartel10 which applied
bids, establish output restrictions or quotas, or share or divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers,
territories or lines of commerce (Paris: OECD, April 27–28, 1998), C(98)35/Final.
3 For instance, following conviction for the cartel offence under s.188 of the Enterprise Act in the UK;
note the recent sentences imposed in R. v Whittle, Brammar and Allison, not yet reported, June 11, 2008
Southwark Crown Court.
4 e.g. the comment by former EC Commissioner for Competition, Mario Monti, that international cartels
were like “cancers on the open-market economy” (Speech/00/295 at the third Nordic Competition Policy
Conference, “Fighting Cartels Why and How? Why should we be concerned with cartels and collusive
behaviour?” (Stockholm: September 11, 2000) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/index 2000.html
[Accessed March 13, 2009]).
5 European Commission, ec.europa.eu/comm./competition/cartels/statistics, June 25, 2008 update.
6 European Commission, ec.europa.eu/comm./competition/cartels/statistics, June 25, 2008 update.
7 For instance, in September 2008, the Netherlands Competition Authority fined five nursing home
organisations a total of ¤7.8 million in respect of a market sharing arrangement: Global Competition Review,
September 29, 2008.
8 This is especially evident in the arguments presented in appeals against the amount of fines as calculated
by the European Commission.
9 AC-Treuhand AG v Commission (T-99/04) [2008] 5 C.M.L.R. 13.
10 Decision 2005/439 (Organic Peroxides) [2005] OJ L110/44.
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to the Swiss consultancy firm AC Treuhand, finding that the firm was in breach of
Art.81(1) EC and imposing a fine on the company. The Organic Peroxide Cartel had
been in operation between 1971 and 1999 and a number of producers had been fined
by the Commission a total of nearly ¤70 million for engaging in the cartel. In addition,
the Commission had also decided that AC Treuhand, which had provided secretariat
functions to the cartel from 1993 to 1999, was also thereby in breach of Art.81(1) EC
and imposed a fine on the company of ¤1,000 (the amount was nominal since this was the
first time since 198011 that an undertaking not involved in the production or distribution
of the commodity, but facilitating the cartel’s operation had been penalised). Treuhand
challenged the legality of the Commission’s decision on the ground that the company
was not active on the market and so not covered by the prohibition of Art.81(1) EC, and
that the Commission had thereby breached the principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena
sine lege. However, the CFI confirmed that Treuhand’s role, though not active in the
market of the relevant product, was that of a passive “co-perpetrator” within the cartel
and so was caught by Art.81 EC. The Court stated in particular that,
“it is sufficient for the Commission to show that the undertaking concerned attended
meetings at which anticompetitive agreements were concluded, without manifesting
its opposition to such meetings, to prove to the requisite legal standard that that
undertaking participated in the cartel . . . Where an undertaking tacitly approves
an unlawful initiative, without publicly distancing itself from the content of that
initiative or reporting it to the administrative authorities, the effect of its behaviour
is to encourage the continuation of the infringement and to compromise its discovery.
It thereby engages in a passive form of participation in the infringement.”12
This provides a statement of the legal basis for what might be termed “facilitator liability”,
and confirms that the net of liability extends to the cartel’s friends as well as members
of the cartel itself. The Court emphasised that even “subsidiary, accessory or passive”
participation was sufficient to incur some liability for the whole infringement. In that
way, the judgment refines the understanding of the concept and scope of the cartel as a
prohibited organisation.
It should be noted at this point what more precisely had been the role of this consultancy
firm. Large scale business cartels are complex and sophisticated organisations which
require careful planning and management. The cartel will be constructed around a
sequence of communications and perhaps meetings which naturally have to be covert
in nature and managed in a careful way regarding evidence. The Organic Peroxides
Cartel called upon expert services for this purpose, first of all using Fides Trust AG,
and thereafter Treuhand. Fides and Treuhand organised meetings and supplied logistical
assistance. The Commission found that Treuhand played a key role in the operation of
the cartel, by organising meetings (often outside EU jurisdiction, in Zurich), producing
and carrying out calculations for the so-called “pink” and “red” papers which stated the
11 In its decision relating to the Italian Cast Glass Cartel (Decision 80/1334 (Italian Cast Glass Cartel )
[1980] OJ L383/19) the Commission imposed liability for infringing Art.85(1) EC on a consultancy firm.
Treuhand asserted that the Commission subsequently “abandoned” its approach on this question. The Court
of First Instance did not appear to view the approach as abandoned, but found that a future indictment of a
consultancy firm was reasonably foreseeable (AC-Treuhand [2008] 5 C.M.L.R. 13 at [147]).
12 AC-Treuhand at [130].
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agreed market shares and were kept safely at Treuhand’s office, and engaging in such
tactics as the reimbursement of travel expenses of individual participants in the meetings,
so as to cover the traces of the meetings. Treuhand’s role was, therefore, to ensure the
effective operation of the cartel, while also working to ensure its secret character, and
as such was consciously law-defying.
At a similar time, the recent first-ever convictions and sentences for cartel offending
under the UK Enterprise Act13 have complemented this development in the regulation of
cartel facilitation. The criminal proceedings at Southwark Crown Court in June 200814
arose from the US investigation and prosecution of three British businessmen for their
involvement in the Marine Hoses Cartel. As part of a plea bargain negotiated by the
defendants, it was agreed that they would plead guilty to the British cartel offence
in order for them to be convicted and serve prison terms in the United Kingdom.15
There are a number of points of interest in this proceeding (not least that it involved
the first convictions for the British cartel offence)16 but the issue of relevance to the
present discussion concerns the role of one of the three defendants in relation to the
cartel. The first defendant, Whittle, was not actually representing a producer company
participating in the market-sharing and bid-rigging activity, but was described as the
cartel co-ordinator, which activity he carried out through his own consulting company.
This conviction therefore works in parallel, at an individual level, with the confirmation
of Treuhand’s infringement of Art.81(1) EC at the corporate level, and so reinforces the
expansive concept of cartel offending as including facilitating activities.
Again, it would be useful to explain further the role of cartel co-ordinator on the part of
this particular defendant. The main role of Whittle’s company, PW Consulting Oil and
Marine Ltd, was the implementation of the cartel agreement through the organisation of
meetings, reports and sham contract bids, all of which were essential for the operation
of the cartel. The substance of this “cartel co-ordination” is summed up in the following
extract from the judgment:
“This was a full-time job. The cartel was run as it had to be with meticulous attention
to detail. Code names were used, clandestine meetings were organised and held,
agreements were reached, both in relation to the market share and for the bogus
contract bids. All of this was illustrated and monitored by monthly reports. There was
a formally agreed decision-making process by which the successful company would
be nominated as the champion for that contract. There were rules for compliance. The
parties communicated through the use of code names when they or their companies
became more concerned about compliance and they disguised their contract with
one another and with [Whittle] through the use of email accounts that . . . had no
13 Enterprise Act 2002 s.188 Ch.40.
14 R. v Whittle, Brammar and Allison, not yet reported, June 10, 2008.
15 The plea bargain included agreed prison terms of 20–30 months, which could be served in the UK on
the basis of pleading guilty and conviction for the UK cartel offence, but also an undertaking to return to
the US and complete prison terms there if the UK sentences proved to be shorter than those agreed to in the
plea bargain. See OFT Press Release, “Three imprisoned in first OFT criminal prosecution for bid-rigging”
(June 11, 2008).
16 The offence has been in force for four years and the first trial has been awaited with interest to examine
the way in which the requirement of dishonesty would be dealt with. However, this was not a trial as such
and so the matter remains to be tested (probably in the forthcoming trial of four BA defendants, referred to
below).
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connection with the companies they represented . . . All of the bid documentation
had to be prepared . . . this was indeed a labour intensive exercise, time consuming
and highly sophisticated.”17
Once more, what may be noted about this form of conduct is that it formed a substantial
activity in its own right which was essential to the working of the cartel—that it
contributed not only to the realisation of the cartel’s substantive objectives but also an
important part of the cover-up operation. This point is stressed since it helps to convey
an idea of what is delinquent and morally objectionable in cartel behaviour: that it is
not only a matter of anticompetitive damage (what may be thought of as the substantive
predicate offending) but also a matter of deliberate planning of something known to be
illegal and with a strong element of sophisticated subterfuge. Both of these elements of
offending were some time ago captured in the well-know Sherman Act formulation of
this kind of offending conduct, as a criminal offence under US law, as a conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce.
Such recent judgments provide, therefore, a useful clarification of the nature and extent
of cartel offending, at both the corporate and the individual level. They serve notice that
the offensive conduct does not simply comprise actions such as fixing prices or sharing
markets, what might be termed specific anticompetitive strategies. The term cartel in
itself refers to an organisation, and it is that aspect of organisation and subterfuge that is
both necessary for the realisation of anticompetitive aims but also supplies an element of
delinquency over and above the anticompetitive strategy in itself. In that last sense, the
concept of the anticompetitive business cartel bears comparison with the concept of the
joint criminal enterprise which has been used in recent years in relation to crimes against
humanity and war crimes,18 as a means of ensuring that liability extends to facilitating
and master-minding parties. The inclusion of cartel facilitators within the definition of
competition infringement and offending has therefore two points of significance which
deserve some further comment: first, the way in which this development enlightens
the current sense of delinquency (and now criminality) attaching to such conduct; and
secondly, the legal implications of including acts of facilitation within the definition of
infringement or offence, which effectively imports the concept of joint criminal enterprise
into cartel regulation.
The extent of delinquency: why are cartelists like criminals?
The application of sanctions to anticompetitive cartels and their intended deterrent effect
now comprise a significant body of legal activity. Many of the arguments and appeals
relating to the European Commission’s decisions against companies found to be involved
in cartels now relate to the imposition of fines and the justification for the size of these
now very substantial penalties.19 At the same time, the European model of cartel control
17 R. v Whittle, not yet reported, per Geoffrey Rivlin J. The judge addressed the defendant in passing a
three year prison sentence, stating: “You were deeply involved in all this dishonesty; indeed it formed the
basis of your whole working life . . .. You were the co-ordinator, and you did that job very efficiently.”
18 See Corwin D. Edwards, Control of Cartels and Monopolies: an International Comparison (Oceana
Publications, 1967) and Norris v United States of America (2008) UKHL 16.
19 See the discussion in Christopher Harding and Alun Gibbs, “Why Go to Court in Europe? An Analysis
of Cartel Appeals, 1995–2004” (2005) 30 E.L. Rev. 349.
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is now replicated at the national level, and investigations and sanctions at that level
comprise a significant and inter-related complement to the EC level enforcement. One
part of this complementary enforcement is the possibility in some national systems that
criminal liability and criminal sanctions may be imposed on individuals involved in
corporate cartel conduct. The whole is tied together by a now clear official rhetoric
which condemns business cartels in the strongest terms and casts cartel activity as highly
delinquent conduct which merits criminalisation: hence the resort to massive corporate
fines and to prison terms for individual executives. But such prosecutorial and judicial
practice needs to be reflected in the legal definition of the infringement, and this is the
argument underlying Treuhand’s invocation of the principle nullum crimen, nulla poena
sine lege in AC-Treuhand, the idea that there must be a clear legal basis for prohibition,
liability and sanctioning. While the Court of First Instance’s judgment is convincing
enough on the firm’s contribution to the operation of the cartel, there may be more
substance in the objection that the legal delineation of punishable cartel conduct is in
need of greater specificity and definition.
What, then, is the punishable part of an infringement of Art.81 EC? First, it is clear that
many infringements of that provision are not such as to deserve a penalty. The power to
impose penalties is laid down in Arts 23 and 24 of Council Regulation 1/2003,20 most
of the detail of which covers specific procedural “offences” such as supplying incorrect
or misleading information, or failing to comply with commitments and decisions. In
substantive terms Art.23(2) simply refers to an intentional or negligent infringement
of Art.81 EC, while Art.23(3) states that the gravity and duration of the infringement
should be taken into account in fixing the amount of any fine. Thus, in legislative terms,
there is little more than a broad sense that “serious” infringements are the punishable
violations. A fuller sense of what is comprised in such punishable violations (or Art.81
EC “offences”) can be gained from the Commission’s Guidelines on the method of setting
fines21 and the “sentencing practice” or case law of the Commission, the Court of First
Instance and the Court of Justice.22 But it should be noted that such legal sources for
definition of the offending conduct constitute an exercise in working backwards from
discussion of an appropriate penalty, rather than any a priori definition, and are the result
of incremental and often judicial specification. In this way, a kind of “cartel offence”
could be constructed for instance from the reference in para.23 of the Commission’s
Guidelines on the method of setting fines to horizontal price-fixing, market-sharing and
output limitation agreements, which are usually secret, and by their very nature among
the most harmful restrictions of competition, and heavily fined as a matter of policy. But
such ex post facto patchworking still lacks the degree of specificity23 usually required
for offence definition in systems of criminal law.
Something more specific may be quarried from judicial statements and analysis emerging
from appeals against Commission decisions in cartel cases, in particular from the idea
20 Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Arts 81 and 82 of
the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1.
21 Guidelines on the method of setting fines pursuant to Art.23(2)(a) of Regulation 1/2003 [2006] OJ
C210/2.
22 See the summary in Christopher Harding and Julian Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe: A Study of
Legal Control of Corporate Delinquency (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.242 et seq.
23 On specificity as a principle, see Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press,
2003), pp.145–147.
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of the “cartel as a whole”, encapsulating what is essentially being penalised in this area
of anticompetitive activity. This concept suggests that it is not simply a matter of anti-
competitive objective (for instance, to fix prices) but also the supporting infrastructure
of plans, meetings and implementing measures. A good example is provided by the
Commission’s description of what was being strongly condemned and penalised in the
case of the Pre-Insulated Pipes Cartel,
“an infrastructure of regular meetings and . . . a continuing process of business
diplomacy aimed at reconciling [the companies’] respective interests. For the purpose
of forming and carrying out their scheme, the participants did things which they had
advised and agreed to do, including (but not limited to) participating in meetings
to discuss prices, sales quotas and project-sharing; agreeing during those meetings
to charge particular prices and to increase and maintain prices; drafting, agreeing
and distributing model price-lists to be used for co-ordinating pricing; exchanging
information on sales volumes, market size and market shares so as to set up a quota
system; and agreeing a sales quota system. The discussions may have involved a
shifting constellation of alliances, even threats of reprisal or hostile action.”24
This sense of a continuing joint enterprise has also been referred to by the Court of First
Instance as, “an integrated set of schemes constituting a single infringement”.25 Such
analysis leads back to the very idea of the cartel as a kind of illegal enterprise and to
the notion that it is involvement in the cartel which is viewed as offensive as much as
specific anticompetitive objectives.
It is important to emphasise the element of deliberate and carefully planned organisation
in this context, as something which contributes to the sense of delinquency. Fifty years
ago, outside of North America, such business cartels, while they may have been regarded
as requiring regulation, were not seen as reprehensible or delinquent arrangements.26 As
the regulation of cartels as a matter of competition policy within the EC became so
much firmer during the 1960s and 1970s, and their condemnation became categorical, so
too the persistent engagement in such activities became so much more a matter of legal
defiance and furtive operation.27 The outcome was a “spiral of delinquency”, whereby
illicit planning and secretive implementation added a further layer of illegal activity.
Business cartels became a matter of anticompetitive strategy plus collusive obstruction of
justice, and it was then the latter, as much as or indeed more than the former, which may
be seen as providing a significant justification for penal treatment and any criminalisation.
However, the cartel, as distinct from its specific anticompetitive goals, remains
insufficiently articulated as an object of penality. The idea is there implicitly in some of
the wording employed in Art.81 EC (“concerted practice”) and was developed further
in the concept of the “cartel as a whole”. When individual participation in a cartel was
24 Decision (IV/35.691/E-4—Pre-Insulated Pipe Cartel ) [1999] OJ L24/1, 51.
25 Rhoˆne-Poulenc SA v Commission (T-1/89, etc.) [1991] E.C.R. II-867 at [1074-5] (judgment on the
Polypropylene Cartel appeal).
26 See in particular the survey contained in Edwards, Control of Cartels and Monopolies: an International
Comparison, 1967. Interestingly, also, the recent analysis by the House of Lords in Norris (2008) UKHL
16, stated that secret price fixing (prior to 2003) did not qualify as the common law offence of conspiracy
to defraud, since it lacked dishonesty or other comparable “aggravating” features.
27 For an overview, see Christopher Harding and Julian Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe, 2003, Ch.4.
(2009) 34 E.L. REV. April  2009 THOMSON REUTERS (LEGAL) LIMITED AND CONTRIBUTORS
Christopher Harding 305
criminalised in the UK Enterprise Act, there was an attempt to capture this additional
layer of “delinquency” by inserting the requirement of dishonesty into s.188 of the
legislation. But, arguably, dishonesty is not the most appropriate concept for purposes
of conveying the sense of wrongdoing involved in deliberate, contumacious, furtive and
obstructive conduct that is now regarded as characteristic of “hard core” cartels.28 But it is
precisely this kind of furtive planning and organisation that was assigned to AC Treuhand
to facilitate the operation of the Organic Peroxide Cartel and to PW Consulting Oil and
Marine to aid the Marine Hoses Cartel. Moreover, it is instructive to note that, in the latest
stage of the Norris extradition saga29 within the United Kingdom, the US Department of
Justice has now switched its attention to obstruction of justice charges for purposes of
finding sufficient double criminality to match under English law the seriousness of the
Sherman Act offence within the United States. American prosecutors have argued that
the alleged cartelist was involved in cover-up activities, by establishing a task force to
destroy or conceal incriminating documentary evidence, and preparing scripts to be used
by any employees facing questions from investigators. So far, the British Magistrates
Court has ruled that,
“even though the price-fixing charge has gone, the remaining obstruction charges are
not only distinct and substantial offences, they are ones of such gravity that standing
alone they merit prosecution”.30
This ruling serves to bring the obstruction to justice element to the fore, illuminating
what is especially delinquent in a cartel operation—the cover-up as much as (or even
more than?) the anticompetitive motive.
Treuhand, Whittle and Norris each performed an essential facilitating role in relation to
their respective cartels. These recent court rulings recognise the significance of that role,
but also usefully affirm something of the appropriate delinquency, criminality and penality
of cartel conduct. Or, the matter may be phrased more graphically: that there may be some
doubt as to whether a price fixer should go to prison, but less reservation in imprisoning
a facilitator who engages in obstructive subterfuge. The persisting problem regarding the
penalisation and criminalisation of anticompetitive conduct in itself arises from a change
in economic theory rather than one in public perception. The House of Lords’ judgment
in Norris harked back to earlier economic theory and policy, which saw some virtue
(for instance, preventing the lowering of wages, or unemployment) in restraints of trade,
and could interpret anticompetitive action as the acceptable promotion of own business
interests rather than the malicious injury of other parties.31 But economic theory at the start
of the 21st century is much more conscious of the effect of companies’ pricing decisions
on the welfare of consumers. Cartel criminalisation across jurisdictions is still in search
of a commonly agreed element of criminality: sometimes anticompetitive behaviour in
28 Again, see the House of Lords judgment in Norris (2008) UKHL 16.
29 Ian Norris, former Chief Executive of Morgan Crucible, was the subject of an extradition request by
the Department of Justice, to stand trial in Pennsylvania in connection with his involvement in the Carbon
Products Cartel. The first extradition attempt failed when the House of Lords ruled earlier in 2008 that
conspiracy to defraud would not have applied to price fixing activities at the time of the cartel’s operation
(Norris (2008) UKHL 16). The Enterprise Act offence could not be called in aid since the operation of the
cartel pre-dated the enactment of the cartel offence in the UK.
30 District Judge Nicholas Evans, sitting in City of Westminster Magistrates Courts, July 25, 2008.
31 Norris (2008) UKHL 16 at [17].
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itself will suffice, sometimes something more, such as dishonesty, is required. Shifting
the focus of delinquency to cartel subterfuge may help in this search for a widely and
commonly accepted sense of serious wrongdoing.
What counts as participation in the cartel: the cartel as joint criminal enterprise
The Court of First Instance has confirmed that it is some kind of knowing involvement
in the “cartel as a whole” which provides the basis for liability under Art.81(1) EC, and
liability for fines under reg.1 of Regulation 1/2003. As seen above, the Court has also
confirmed in Treuhand that a “passive” facilitating role (as distinct from an “active”
anticompetitive producer role) is covered by that liability. This raises the question of
different roles within the cartel and how far the web of connected activity may extend
for purposes of liability. It is at this point that the analogy with the concept of joint
criminal enterprise becomes instructive. On closer examination, the analogy is striking,
since the legal contexts at first sight seem very different, yet the vocabulary, concepts
and definitions of offending participation are similar.32
The idea of joint criminal enterprise (JCE) has been developed in particular by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) but has a clearly
analogous application in relation to a range of serious criminal activity arising in
an organisational context, from war crimes and crimes against humanity to organised
crime and terrorism.33 The concept has started to make an appearance in a range of
jurisdictions, such as that of the International Criminal Court (in Art.25 of the Court’s
Statute), the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Special Panel for Serious Crimes in East
Timor, and the US military commissions.34 In broad terms, it serves the prosecution of
significant connected actors who do not “get their hands dirty” but direct or facilitate
the predicate offending of operatives within an organisational context. Thus, it is a
device which captures the participation of and imposes liability on criminal mastermind
and “godfather” figures, and a range of facilitators of criminal activity (corrupt police,
politicians, financiers or officials; suppliers of equipment or logistical support; advisers;
guards and getaway drivers). The role of such actors is essential but indirect, and thus less
easily proven; hence the value of a device which first defines a criminal enterprise and
then assigns liability to specified forms of participation in such enterprise. The analogy
with the instances of cartel facilitation discussed above should therefore be clear.
32 Consider for instance some of the language used by the CFI in Treuhand [2008] 5 C.M.L.R. 13
at [130]: “The Commission must prove that the undertaking intended . . . to contribute to the common
objectives pursued by the participants as a whole and that it was aware of the substantive conduct planned
or implemented by other undertakings in pursuance of those objectives, or that it could reasonably have
foreseen that conduct and that it was ready to accept the attendant risk.” This is conceptually very close to
the JCE.
33 For discussion of the development of the JCE (sometimes also referred to as a “common purpose, design,
or plan”), see Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.181–189;
Allison Marston Danner and Jenny S. Martinez, “Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command
Responsibility and the Development of International Criminal Law” (2005) California Law Review 75;
Christopher Harding, Criminal Enterprise: Individuals, Organisations and Criminal Responsibility (Willan
Publishing, 2007), Ch.10.
34 For an overview of these developments, see Danner and Martinez, “Guilty Associations” (2005)
California Law Review 75.
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But the use of the JCE concept brings risks as well as advantages. One obvious risk is
the temptation to make an enterprise overly inclusive and cast the net of liability too
widely (notorious examples have been membership of the Nazi party, or the category
of ‘enemy combatant’ for purposes of the US military commissions35). A related risk
concerns the role within the enterprise, and the possibility that this may be tenuous or
insufficiently proximate to the core activity and objectives of the enterprise. For example,
should liability extend to a passive “turning away”, such as that of a person who stands
by in a crowd and does not come forward to prevent an act of violence, or decides not
to act as a whistle-blower within a company? Therefore, in a technical and legal sense,
it is necessary to have, first, a clear and acceptably delineated scope of the enterprise
in question, and secondly, a clear and acceptably defined participatory role within the
enterprise. Clearly, these two issues are interrelated, and may be brought together in a
legal test of significant participation in relation to achieving the essential goals of the
enterprise.36
In the context of anticompetitive business cartels, the cartel as an enterprise is likely to
be in its nature relatively well defined. There may be problems of evidence in practice
(for instance, concerning the duration of the cartel and its exact membership at particular
points in time37), but usually the goals, scope and structure of cartels are clear and
typical. In fact, the business cartel is a quintessentially typical unlawful organisation or
enterprise.38 However, more care may be required in specifying the kinds of participation
in cartel activity that may justifiably ground liability for an infringement of Art.81 EC, or
a national level criminal offence. The roles carried out by AC-Treuhand39 and the other
defendants referred to above would seem clear enough in terms of their significance for
the cartel and that is an important point to be taken on board now by legal advisers:
that such contribution to the organisation and operation of the cartel, though provided by
parties described as “consultants”, will be easily sufficient for both Art.81 EC and any
criminal liability. But it is possible to envisage cases involving a less direct connection
and more marginal role, in which a test of significant relation, or “definite and decisive
causal link”, may be less easily applied.
One issue, for example, at both the corporate and individual level, may be that of the
potential liability of senior actors within corporate structures. If the actual level of
collusion is that of marketing managers rather than the highest level of management,
35 See for instance the discussion in Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2003, and Danner and Martinez,
“Guilty Associations” (2005) California Law Review 75.
36 As argued, for instance, by Danner and Martinez, “Guilty Associations” (2005) California Law Review
75 and Harding, Criminal Enterprise, 2007. As Danner and Martinez comment in relation to the ICTY
defendant Tadic´ (who was present at a homicidal ethnic cleansing incident), “holding Tadic´ liable, however,
for all the crimes visited on Bosnian Muslims in the early 1990s would seem patently unjust”, though it
would be less so for Slobodan Milosevic (Danner and Martinez, “Guilty Associations” (2005) California
Law Review 75, 150).
37 These are often the issues contested in appeals against fines.
38 See the definition of “structured association” in the 1998 EU Joint Action on making it a criminal
offence to participate in a criminal organisation in the Member States of the European Union [1998] OJ
L351/1 Art.1.
39 The CFI commented for instance, in relation to Treuhand, that the company had actively contributed to
the implementation of the cartel and that there was a sufficiently definite and decisive causal link, “between
its activity and the restriction of competition on the organic peroxides market” (AC-Treuhand [2008]
5 C.M.L.R. 13 at [154]).
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or that of a subsidiary rather than a parent company, to what extent should those at the
higher level (whether corporate or human) be seen as implicated in the anticompetitive
activity and be held legally liable? Would the answer differ according to whether the
actors in question are human or corporate—would human and corporate roles (for instance
as a CEO, or parent company) be viewed differently in this context and for this purpose?
Two recent cases illustrate this aspect of cartel involvement.
First, the human/corporate person relationship was at issue in the BA/Virgin price-fixing
case dealt with by the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in 2007.40 BA and Virgin Atlantic
colluded on fuel surcharges (a levy imposed on passengers to cover the rising cost of
oil), and investigations and fines followed Virgin’s decision to apply for leniency. The
price fixing had been arranged at the sales and marketing level by a small group of sales
and communications managers, some of whom are now facing criminal prosecution in
the United Kingdom for their involvement in the cartel.41 As a company BA has stressed
that the cartel arrangement was “deeply regrettable” and contrary to the company’s
own guidelines, and appears to be quite happy with the imminent criminal prosecution
of the individuals responsible for the surcharge collusion.42 There has been no serious
questioning of the parallel responsibility of the human and corporate actors in this case
and imposition of sanctions on both, and this illustrates the way in which the cartel
is a kind of joint enterprise involving different forms of participation. The individual
executives were in one sense the predicate offenders, but they acted through and for the
company, and indeed the infringement could only be committed by the company, whose
market role was essential for purposes of achieving the anti-competitive goals.
The complexities of corporate participation in a cartel are nicely revealed by considering
the involvement of the Shell Company in the Dutch Road Bitumen Cartel, dealt with
by the European Commission in 2006.43 The company is a huge conglomerate with a
complex and changing corporate structure, and it was necessary for the Commission to
identify precisely the extent of the corporate involvement in the cartel, for purposes of
imposing liability and sanctions on particular companies within Shell’s overall corporate
structure. In this case the actual collusive agreements were arranged by an employee of
Shell Nederland Verkoopmaatschappij BV. The latter was completely owned by Shell
Nederland BV, one of the main group holding companies within Shell, and that company
was in turn jointly controlled by the two ultimate parent companies within the Shell
group. Each member company of the group has representation on the board of one of
the two ultimate parent companies. Considering this evidence of decision-making and
policy-making interconnection, the Commission decided that,
“the argument that Shell has not found evidence that apart from the employee who
participated in the cartel meeting anyone else within the Shell group was aware of
40 OFT Press Release 113/07 (August 1, 2007).
41 OFT Press Release 93/08. Charges are being brought against four individuals: the former head of sales
for the company, head of sales for UK and Ireland, marketing director, and head of communications. These
four are on a list of 10 former and current BA executives identified by the US Department of Justice for
possible extradition and prosecution for offence under The Sherman Act in the US.
42 The Chief Executive of BA has stated that he would be happy for full details of the case to emerge in
court because, “people deserve to know what happened”. For public relations purposes the company clearly
wishes to distance itself from the cartel.
43 Decision 2007/534 (Dutch Road Bitumen) [2007] OJ L106/40.
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the alleged infringement, does not exclude the other entities in the Shell group from
part of the undertaking that committed the infringement and may be held liable for
that infringement”.44
This decision again confirms a wider extent of corporate participation, even in cases
where the company in itself or senior levels of management may have been unaware of
the collusion taking place. It may be that the legal basis for such decisions and rulings
on participation require some fuller and more explicit working out. But it is likely that
any more developed justification would rely on some theory of joint enterprise, requiring
an examination of the role of different actors, entities or legal persons within a large
and complex organisation or corporate structure. In cartel cases involving companies,
one likely argument may be that referred to above: that, even if the corporate person
is unaware of an individual’s behaviour, the corporate personality remains an essential
site for the realisation of the individual’s actions—the individual acts for and through
the company and indeed would not be engaging in that behaviour if the company did
not exist. Both individual and company are necessary participants in the cartel, although
they may regarded as having different roles in that illegal enterprise.
The JCE is therefore a useful model to bear in mind when exploring the legal implications
of participation and involvement in cartel activity. It is likely that more questions of
this kind will arise as the enforcement of rules against cartels (whether in relation to
individuals or corporate persons) gathers pace. Some of these issues may prove complex
and ethically challenging, as has been demonstrated already when employing the concept
of the JCE in the context of war crime prosecution, and further argument concerning the
role, proximity, awareness and degree of foresight of certain actors within cartels may
be anticipated.
Conclusion
Recent judicial decisions at both European and national level have confirmed the liability
of corporate and individual actors who facilitate the operation of anti-competitive business
cartels. In the first place, this serves to illuminate the sense of delinquency and criminality
now attached to such conduct, as involving a significant element of subterfuge in addition
to an anti-competitive intent, but the former needs to be more explicitly enunciated in
legal policy. Secondly, facilitator liability also suggests an analogy between the concepts
of the cartel and the joint criminal enterprise, and the latter concept may usefully inform
the ongoing legal exploration of cartel liability, especially to the extent that such liability
comes to be seen as a matter of various kinds of participation in an agreed illegal
enterprise.
44 Dutch Road Bitumen at [214].
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